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SUMMARY
National flood insurance programs implement flood prevention,
create flood zone land-use policy, and establish protocols for relief
With climate change and development raising the risk and exposure of
human populations to flood, the United States'National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) has been heavily scrutinized, especially in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina. This article examines the validity of the two main
criticisms of NFIP, and seeks to inform a better understanding of NFIP's
integrity through a comparative analysis between NFIP and several
different flood insurance models in Europe. As a result, this analysis
yields recommendations that can benefit NFIP, as well lives and
properties vulnerable to flood risk in the United States.
. Harvard University (B.A., cum laude, 2003); University of Miami School of
Law (J.D., cum laude, 2009).
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"In Nature, there is no flood damage."'
A. INTRODUCTION
Fundamentally natural events, "[f]loods only lead to
damage when uses by human beings are detrimentally affected.
The more intensively and the less suitably the flood basin is used,
the greater the potential for damage and then the actual damage
when flood occurs." 2 Furthermore, as the most frequent natural
disaster in the world, flooding accounts for the greatest human
and economic losses in the world.3
Floods are increasing in frequency and severity due to
both climate change and development that is catalyzed by a
growing and expanding human population. The prevalence of
floods4 makes it impractical to relocate all human settlement away
1 Best Practices on Flood Prevention, Protection and Mitigation, 19 (2004)
(updating the United Nations and Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE)
Guidelines on Sustainable Flood Prevention (2000)), available at
http://www.floods.org/PDF/intl BestPractices EU 2004.pdf [hereinafter Best
Practices].2 Id.
' M. Kok, J.K. Vrijling, P.H.A.J.M Van Gelder & M.P. Vogelsang, Risk of
Flooding and Insurance in The Netherlands, in FLOOD DEFENCE: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON FLOOD DEFENCE , VOLUME II
146, 147 (Wu et al. eds., 2002).
4 "Flooding is the most common natural disaster in the United States. Most
homeowners insurance does not cover flood damage. Floods and flash floods
happen in all 50 states.... Every year, flooding impacts thousands of property
owners across the United States. Most of them don't expect it because their
property 'isn't in a flood zone.' The truth is: Everyone lives in a flood zone. Just
because a property has a low risk of flooding doesn't mean there's no risk.
Flooding can happen anywhere at any time, whether it's a flash flood from heavy
rains in the desert, an overflowing river, or simply water with nowhere to go
because of urban construction. One in four insurance claims for flood damage
comes from low-to-moderate risk flood zones. Properties in high-risk flood
zones have a 26% chance of flood damage over the period of a 30-year
mortgage." First American Flood Data Services, Flood Basics,
http://www.freaflood.com/flood/basics/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
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from flood risks; thus it is imperative to explore ways to reduce
the destruction caused by floods.
Beyond the purview of legislation that directly regulates
flood zone management, flood insurance programs provide an
especially important vehicle for the implementation of flood
prevention and flood zone land-use policy and relief. By
examining the validity of the criticisms of United States' National
Flood Insurance Program ("NFIP"), especially in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, this paper will compare NFIP to different flood
insurance models in Europe - the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, and the Netherlands - in terms of (1) governmental role,
(2) mitigation of flood risks, and (3) participation of the national
population. Compared to its European counterparts, from a
policy standpoint, NFIP provides a progressive and
comprehensive flood management program. Nonetheless, a
comparative analysis of European flood insurance models yields
several improvements that could benefit NFIP, as well as the lives
and properties at risk in the United States.
B. DESIRABILITY AND CHALLENGES OF FLOOD INSURANCE
I. Why have flood insurance in the first place?
Society is challenged with promoting behavior and
investments in flood risk reduction, while placing the burden of
compensation on those who suffer the most and mitigate flood
risks the least.5 Policy-wise, "[flood] insurance is one the most
effective policy tools for achieving both objectives, because it
rewards investments in cost-effective mitigation with lower
premiums and provides indemnifications should a disaster
occur."
6
5 Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses through Insurance, 12 JOUR.
RISK& UNCERT. 171, 180 (1996).
6 Id. at 180. The article notes as follows: "[t]his presumes that both homeowners
and insurers are aware of state-of-the-art technologies and can determine what
impact they will have on reducing expected losses from future disasters." Id. at
185.
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Additionally, flood insurance can reduce post-disaster
governmental assistance funded by taxpayers because flood
insurance premiums can provide an independent and significant
source of funding. Furthermore, when the availability of flood
insurance is tied to the enforcement of flood-risk reduction, land-
use activity and construction, flood insurance can reduce the need
for - or amount of - post-disaster governmental assistance for
relief, recovery, and reconstruction. 7
II. Centralized risk and skewed risk perception make it difficult to
sustainably provide flood insurance.
In order for an insurer to compensate an insured party for
a loss resulting from an event, the insurer must "amass relatively
small contributions, premiums, from many persons who are
exposed to risk of occurrence of an unforeseen event in order to
create a fund to reimburse those clients who actually suffer from
such an occurrence." 8
Flood events threaten the sustainability of flood insurance
given the difficulty of predicting floods and the high human and
economic tolls of flood disasters.9 Independence of events assures
that funding is not depleted with one occurrence, which is the
main difficulty of providing flood insurance because when many
properties are damaged by the same event, funds may be heavily
tolled, thus jeopardizing the ability of an insurer to pay out claims
and continue to provide coverage. 10 Additionally, funds to pay
out claims are even more threatened by the adverse selection of
individuals who live in high flood risk zones, realize the risk of
flood, and thus dominate flood insurance policies.11
7 NFIP HANDBOOK FOR RHODE ISLAND COMMUNITIES, at 1 available at
http://www.planning.state.ri.us/nfip/pdf/nfip.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2007)
[hereinafter NFIP RI].
8 M. Kok, et al., supra note 3, at 147.
9 See Kunreuther, supra note 5, at 178.
10 See Kok, supra note 3, at 147.
11 "The people most likely to buy insurance against flood losses are also the
most likely to suffer them. That is, the motivated pool of actual insurance
consumers is generally more risky than the pool of all potential consumers.
v. 16
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Although the difficulty in spreading risk deters potential
providers, flood insurance is not necessarily unsustainable. In
order to assure the independence of events, insurance can be
spread over many different types of flood zones and areas, such as
river and lake basins, and coastal areas. 12 Also, re-insuring flood
risk with other catastrophic events adds another layer of risk
spreading for insurers. 1
3
Skewed flood risk perception and expectations of
governmental disaster assistance exacerbate the difficulty of
spreading the risk of flood over populations.14 Often individuals
perceive the probability of a flood "causing damage to their home
as being sufficiently low that the investment in [a] protective
measure will not be justified." 15 This results in deterring people
from investing in flood insurance or activity that would reduce
flood damage, such as retreating from potential flood zones.
Conversely, insuring against flood damage may lead to
moral hazard: insured individuals perceive that they and their
properties are insulated from risk and devastation. This may
inadvertently encourage inappropriate development (and
redevelopment) in flood zones.
Adverse selection occurs when insureds know more about their risk profiles than
their insurers.... Adverse selection has long been thought capable of creating a
'death spiral' in which an unfortunate insurance pool begins to attract riskier
insureds and to deter good risks because the former are getting a good deal and
the latter are overpaying. In theory, such a pool will eventually collapse, as the
necessary rise in premiums reshapes the pool into an increasingly narrow band
of highly risky consumers who (at some point) can no longer afford the
actuarially correct premium." Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders:
Governmental and Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 Miss. C. L. REv. 3,
8-9 (2006).
12 Kok, supra note 3, at 147.
13 id.
14 See Kunreuther, supra note 5, at 177.
15 Kunreuther, supra note 5, at 175.
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C. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF VARIOUS FLOOD INSURANCE
MODELS
Across the globe, flood insurance programs come in
numerous combinations of policies. Nonetheless, flood insurance
programs can roughly be identified by the following
characteristics:
1. Primarily private or public insurance
2. Mandatory or voluntary insurance
3. Available compensation schemes by the government:
A) none or vague
B) ad hoc
C) by law 16
An analysis of the flood insurance programs in the United
States, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, and Germany
illuminates the advantages and disadvantages of the various
characteristics listed above, and provides a foundation to make
recommendations for a more effective flood insurance program in
the United States.
D. NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
I. Background and mechanics
The United States' National Flood Insurance Program, 42
USC §§ 4001 et seq. ("NFIP"),17 is an example of public flood
insurance, which was enacted in 1968 as the government's
//primary tool for managing flood hazards through a combination
of incentives and regulations. " 18 Before NFIP's enactment, flood
insurance in the United States was prohibitively expensive or
16 See generally Kok, supra note 3, at 148 (categorizing flood insurance
solutions based on an analysis of programs in nineteen countries).
17 The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as amended, and The Flood
Disaster Protection Act of 1973, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129 (2005).
18 U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY, Guarding People and Property against
Natural Hazards, in AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 121, 125
(2004).
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unavailable for most high risk flood property.19 Also, before
NFIP, flood victims depended on "federal, taxpayer-financed, ad
hoc disaster assistance." 20 By creating NFIP, Congress intended to
primarily "alleviate the heavy financial burdens and economic
distress that recurring flooding has often created for individuals,
local economic and for the nation as a whole." 21
NFIP operates as a partnership, requiring cooperation
between local municipalities (or more generally, communities),
the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA"), and
property owners.22  In order to receive NFIP coverage,
communities must agree to adopt and administer local floodplain
management aimed at protecting lives and property from future
flooding. Specifically, Section 4022 of Title 42 of the United States
Code prohibits flood insurance coverage as authorized under the
NFIP, "unless an appropriate public body shall have adopted
adequate land use and control measures (with effective
enforcement provisions)" determined by the local NFIP Director.23
Critical for the enforcement of NFIP land use policy,
FEMA provides local communities with four types of
informational documents: the (1) Flood Hazard Boundary Map,
the (2) Flood Insurance Study, the (3) Flood Insurance Rate Map,
and the (4) Flood Boundary-Floodway Map.24
II. Flood Boundary Map
The Flood Hazard Boundary Map ("FHBM") is a basic
map provided by FEMA and given to a community when it joins
the initial, or Emergency Phase of NFIP, which provides a
preliminary delineation of the 100-year floodplain, also known as
19 NFIP RI, supra note 7, at 1.
20 Jason Thomas, Comment, National Flood Insurance Program: Crisis and
Renewal 4 (George Washington University, Working Paper Series, 2006),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-989850 [hereinafter Crisis and Renewal].
21 NFIP RI, supra note 7, at 1.
22 id.
23 42 U.S.C. § 4022 (2005).
24 NFIP RI, supra note 7, at 8.
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a "Special Flood Hazard Area" ("SFHA") or base flood, in a
community.
25
The 100-year floodplain does not mean that a flood occurs
in these zones only once every 100 years.26 Rather, the 100-year
flood refers to the probability that a given event has a one-in-one
hundred chance (1 percent) of occurring in any given year.
27
Communities in SFHAs are required by NFIP to both undertake
the program's floodplain management regulations and also
purchase insurance. 28
111. Flood Insurance Study
In conjunction with local officials, FEMA reports on its
examination, evaluation, and determination of flood hazards for
participating NFIP communities in its Flood Insurance Studies
("FISs").29 FISs provide background on a community's flooding
history, and, where applicable, include: "stream profiles [and]
coastal transects used to calculate water surface elevations for
various flooding conditions, including the 100-year flood. Data on
the width, base flood elevation, and cross-sectional area of
251Id. at 11.
26 Crisis and Renewal, supra note 20, at 9.
21 Id. Furthermore, when the probabilities of flood are compounded, "[a] '100
year' flood has a 9.6 percent chance of occurring in 10 years, a 22 percent
chance of occurring in 25 years, a 39 percent chance of occurring in 50 years,
and an 86 percent chance of occurring in 100 years. Moreover, to reliably
predict a 100-year recurrence event, geologists 'would need 1,000 years of
records, which they do not have. Flood predictions, like those of the weather,
depend on a unique set of environmental variables which are almost never
repeated.' Based on participation rates, it seems unlikely that most residents of
a '100 year floodplain' realize that structures located there have a 26-percent
chance of being flooded over the course of a 30-year mortgage, compared to a 4-
percent chance of fire over the same period. Yet homeowners who avoid
'costly' flood coverage are unlikely to avoid fire insurance, even absent lender
requirements." Id. (internal citations omitted).
28 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Special Flood Hazard Areas,
available at http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/floodplain/nfipkeywords/
sfha.shtm (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
29 NFIP RI, supra note 7, at 11.
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floodways are also given in the FIS for each stream segment
studied in detail." 30
The most important characteristic of FISs is that these
studies inform and lead to the production of Flood Insurance Rate
Maps and Flood Boundary-Floodway Maps.31 These maps form
the basis of a community's floodplain management activity by
providing critical information on flood zones for potential lenders
of construction/ re-construction projects and insurers.32
IV. Flood Insurance Rate Map
Flood Insurance Rate Maps ("FIRMs") signal a
community's transition from the Emergency Phase to the Regular
Phase of NFIP. Compared with FHBMs, FIRMs generally have
more detailed floodplain content and accuracy. 33 Also, FIRMs are
the most widely distributed flood map.34
In FIRMs, base flood elevations are denoted in conjunction
with categorizations within SFHAs. Unlike the content in FHBMs,
within FIRMs, SFHAs and other areas are further refined into
zones, depending on the severity of flood risk and the type of
flood risk present (e.g., coastal, riverine) which are identified by
the following letters: A, AO, AH, A1-30, AE, A99, AR, AR/A1-30,
AR/AE, AR/AO, AR/AH, AR/A, VO, V1-30, VE, and V.35
30 id.
31 Id. at 10.
32 id.
33 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP) Flood Maps, http://msc.fema.gov/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/info?
storeld 10001 &catalogld 10001 &langld -
1 &contentproductFIRM&title-NFIP%20Flood%20MAPS&parentproductlnfo
&parentTitle-Product%20Information (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
34 Id. Note also that the information on FIRMs "is based on historic,
meteorologic, hydrologic, and hydraulic data, as well as open-space conditions,
flood control works, and development." Id.
3 Id.; see also Federal Emergency Management Agency, Definitions of FEMA
Flood Zone Designations, http://msc.fema.gov/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/info?
storeld- 10001 &catalogld- 10001 & langld--
1 &content-floodZones&titleFEMA%20Flood%2OZone%20Designations.
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These distinctions inform community officials, insurance
agents, lenders, and both federal and state agencies on the nature
and estimates of high-risk flood areas throughout a community. 36
Properties located in mapped zones AE, AO, A, or VE are
required to have flood insurance if the owner has a federally
backed mortgage on the property.
V. Flood Boundary-Floodway Map
Finally, FEMA's Flood Boundary-Floodway Maps (FBFMs)
"delineate the boundaries of designated floodways within which
local officials must enforce the NFIP's floodway non-
encroachment standards... FBFMs also indicate the locations and
designations of stream cross-sections." 37 Since 1986, FBFMs have
been incorporated into FIRMs.38
Equipped with FEMA's studies and maps detailing their
flood history and estimated flood risk, communities can make
better-informed decisions about applying for NFIP insurance and
committing to its land management regulations, 39 if not already
required. Impressively, "[over 20,000 communities in all 50
36 NFIP RI, supra note 7, at 12. Specifically FIRMs "provide data needed to
identify areas subject to flooding, determine the base flood elevation and flood
risks of specific properties, locate reference marks needed to establish the
elevation of specific sites, and locate the boundaries of floodways." Id. at 12.
37Id. at 15.
38 id.
39 The most basic examples of NFIP land management are:
1) required permits for all development, and within A or V zones,
required delineation of the 100-year flood boundary and provision of
base flood and structural component elevation data on site plans
2) determination if proposed development has received other necessary
permits
3) prohibition of development or encroachment within designation
floodways
4) prohibition the modification of sand dunes in V-Zones
5) location and construction of utilities to eliminate or minimize flood
damage
6) required elevation of newly constructed or substantially improved
elevation above or at the base (100 year) flood elevation. See id. at 21-
39.
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States, representing about 95 percent of the highest risk
floodplains, participate in the NFIP. The NFIP is now the nation's
largest single-line property insurer in the United States, with 4.8
million policies insuring in excess of $800 billion in assets." 40
Without NFIP, it is likely that most of these policy-holders would
not have had the incentive to develop active programs to manage
flood risks.41
E. CRITICISMS OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
Despite FEMA's mandatory requirement of flood
insurance and compliance with NFIP regulations in high flood-
risk zones and its encouragement of participation in NFIP in other
communities, NFIP faces several challenges in being as effective as
possible. The two main criticisms of NFIP are that 1) NFIP
exacerbates skewed risk perception, worsening the moral hazard 42
of flood insurance, and 2) it is not actuarially sound due to
subsidized insurance premiums and the toll of repetitive-loss
properties, threatening the sustainability of the program.
I. Risk perception
Despite the proactive flood risk mapping undertaken by
FEMA and its contracted experts, the flood maps are based on
estimates. Actual rainfall, coastal storms, or other events that lead
to flooding may be more or less frequent and severe than
expected. The potential mismatch between FEMA estimates and
actual flood events has three negative consequences.
The first consequence is that individuals outside the
highest risk zones, SFHAs, in FEMA's FIRMs are not required to
obtain flood insurance and comply with NFIP, resulting in the
40 Crisis and Renewal, supra note 20, at 5.
4 Guarding People, supra note 18, at 167.
42 "Moral hazard" may be defined as "the disincentive that being insured
removes to engage in the conduct insured against." Wausau Underwriters
Insurance Company v. United Plastics Group Inc., 512 F.3d 953, 959 (7th Cir.
2008).
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misperception that they are immune to floods.43 This perceived
immunity results in lower investment in land use and control
programs, flood insurance, and general awareness of flood risks
that may not be captured by FISs and FIRMs. Unfortunately, too
many individuals are caught unprepared when their communities
are flooded, as "[niationwide, one-third of the flood loss claims
are from property located outside of the mapped 1% (100-year)
floodplain."44
The second consequence is that this false sense of
immunity may also impact individuals who do have flood
insurance but their communities have been flood-free for a
number of years. These communities may view their recent flood-
free experience as indicators of future flood risk and evidence that
FEMA over-estimated flood risk. Too often, individuals with
flood insurance cancel their "policies if they have not made a
claim after a few years." 45 An estimated one in every five
policyholders under NFIP cancels their coverage each year.46
The third consequence of the limitations of FISs and FIRMs
to estimate actual flood events is that individuals who do live in
high-risk flood zones may perceive that compliance with NFIP
regulations is enough to protect themselves and their property
from loss. Assuming that flood threats are sufficiently mitigated,
this sense of immunity thwarts retreat from high risk flood zones.
Too often the assumption that compliance with NFIP
sufficiently protects against the unpredictability of nature is
coupled with the expectation that the government, either through
4, Crisis and Renewal, supra note 20, at 9.
44 Tropical Storm Allison Recovery Project, Flood Insurance Rate Maps (Nov.
2004), http://www.tsarp.org/downloads/FloodlnsuranceRateMaps.pdf.
4' Kunreuther, supra note 5, at 177. Furthermore, "[I]t would not be surprising
to learn that many of these individuals purchased a policy at the time that they
took out a mortgage but failed to renew their policy the next year or several
years later after not experiencing any flood losses. The financial institutions
issuing the mortgage would have had to have looked the other way." Id. at 177-
78 (emphasis added).46 1d. at 177.
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NFIP or ad hoc emergency relief, will compensate damage or loss 47
once a flooding disaster occurs. The main weakness of this
assumption is that the government has a limited ability to pay for
flood insurance claims given the limited ability of NFIP to fund
itself.
II. Actuarial imbalance
National flood insurance is "available in high-risk areas
where no private insurer would be willing to write
policies... [encouraging] more people to locate in these areas,
which has the effect of exposing more assets to flood risk and
increases the total economic losses from flooding."48 NFIP flood
insurance is marketed by private insurers who deposit the
premiums in a federally operated Flood Insurance Fund ("FIF"),49
which pays all claims.50 The flood insurance contract is written by
NFIP, and published in the Federal Register, with no deviation
permitted, and not generally governed by contract law.51 Private
insurers enjoy benefits of selling flood insurance policy by
retaining 30 percent of premiums as commission, and being
compensated for additional loss-adjustment claims.52 However
the government's control over the terms of flood insurance policy
retards the ability of the flood insurance market from gaining the
benefit of actuarially sound priced policies.
By design, FIF is not actuarially sound.53 NFIP is 40
percent underfunded with approximately 26 percent of NFIP
policyholders paying explicitly subsidized premiums. 54 When
NFIP began, it lacked thorough flood data to inform its insurance
rates.55 Therefore NFIP decided to "subsidize policies within the
47 See generally, id.
48 Crisis and Renewal, supra note 20, at 7.
49 The National Flood Insurance Fund is described in 42 U.S.C. § 4017 (2005).
50 Kunreuther, supra note 5, at 173.
51 Scales, supra note 11.
52 id.
5' Kunreuther, supra note 5, at 173.
54 Crisis and Renewal, supra note 20, at 5.
15 Scales, supra note 11, at 15.
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pool of flood insurance consumers while undertaking to create the
required data. These subsidies are substantial and reach deep into
the risk pool." 56 However, NFIP has not phased out these
subsidies within 25 years of its inception as originally planned. 57
Also, during the first few years of NFIP (1968-1973), low
participation rates among high flood risk communities resulted in
"federal ad hoc disaster assistance payments remain[ing] largely
unchanged, and land-use management techniques were not
adopted on a large scale." 58 In response, Congress authorized
NFIP to subsidize property constructed pre-FIRMs in order to
induce participation.59 This effectively grandfathered-in older
properties. Not only did these older properties receive significant
subsidies, "Congress also exempted owners of these subsidized,
or 'pre-FIRM,' structures from the NFIP's floodplain management
requirements, unless these structures are at some later point
substantially damaged 60 or substantially improved. Either of
those events then trigger[s] a requirement to rebuild to current
construction and building code standards." 61 The justification for
leniency towards grandfathered properties is that property built
before the FISs and FIRMs were prepared for the areas in which
they are located were not constructed or priced with flood risk in
mind. 62
In order to avoid compliance with NFIP's land use codes,
grandfathered property owners resist investments in structural
improvements that do not directly translate into higher home
561d. at 15-16.
57 Id. at 16 (noting that in 2006 "38 years have passed, and approximately 28%
of NFIP policies remain subsidized. This in facts reflect substantial progress, as
the subsidization rate was originally 70%.").
58 Crisis and Renewal, supra note 20, at 4.59 Id. at 5.
60 A substantially damaged structure is one whose cost of repair (to bring it back
to its pre-damaged condition) equals or exceeds 50 percent of the market value
of the structure before the damage occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 4011 b(2) (2006); 44
C.F.R. § 59.1 (2007).
61 Crisis and Renewal, supra note 20, at 5.
62 Scales, supra note 11, at 16; see also Kunreuther, supra note 5, at 173.
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prices. 63  This results in buildings that pre-date NFIP maps
accounting for 90 percent of repetitive-loss payments. 64 Although
this statistic "demonstrates the effectiveness and success of NFIP
building standards for new construction in flood-prone areas," it
"also underscores the program's lack of authority for reducing the
vulnerability of older buildings." 65
Another financial burden of repetitive-loss properties,
whether or not they were grandfathered into NFIP, arises from
challenges to local enforcement of NFIP after flood damage.
Although NFIP requires that substantially damaged properties
undertake land use and control measures such as removal or
elevation, 66 local governments in charge of determining
substantial damage are reluctant to qualify properties as such
when property owners do not have the financial resources to
move or elevate their property.67
The burden of repetitive-loss properties is clear:
"J[athough only 2 percent of NFIP covered properties have
received repetitive-loss payments, they account for 40 percent of
overall NFIP payments, many at cumulative totals exceeding the
property's value." 68
Congress has addressed the issue of repetitive-loss
properties with: 1) Section 4030 of Title 42 of the United States
Code, which empowers local NFIP Directors with discretion to
give grants for repetitive-loss properties to undertake mitigation
action,69 and 2) the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004. The
Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance Reform Act of
63 Guarding People, supra note 18, at 168.
64 [d.
65 Id.
66 1d.; 44 CFR § 60.3(c)(2).
6' Guarding People, supra note 18, at 126.
68 Id. Interestingly, "[a]lthough a national problem, between 1978 and 1995,
Louisiana and Texas accounted for $1.1 billion, or 40 percent of the $2.75
billion in total repetitive-loss claims paid by the NFIP." Id.
69 42 U.S.C. § 4030 (2005).
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2004 (FIRA)70 reforms NFIP to disincentivize property owners
from living in repeatedly flooded areas. Instead of providing
insurance compensation for rebuilding, FIRA provides repetitive-
loss property owners assistance in either elevating or moving their
homes away from flood waters. Those who refuse mitigation
assistance would pay the full actuarial costs for remaining to live
in a high risk flood area. 71 Although proactive in addressing the
repeated claims of repetitive-loss properties, enforcement of both
Section 4030 of Title 42 of the United States Code and FIRA are
costly, illustrating the burden of repetitive-loss properties.
NFIP's accounting method compounds the burden of
repetitive-loss properties and subsidies, impacting the viability of
the entire program. Using a cash-based method for accounting
and determining premiums, the program is not structured to
establish a reserve for significant losses in especially heavy flood
years.72 "Instead, total premium income is preset annually to
match a moving twenty-five year average annual loss
experience." 73  This preset results in oscillating and unstable
finances, and budgeting that understates true flood liabilities.
With NFIP's statutory borrowing authority, both of these
phenomena threaten to pass flood losses onto taxpayers,
undermining the purpose of NFIP.74
70 Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004, P.L. 108-264, 118 Stat. 712 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001 et seq. (2005). The act was
called "Two Floods and You Are Out of the Taxpayers' Pocket Act of 2003"
when introduced to the House of Representatives in 2003.
71 Rawle 0. King, Federal Flood Insurance: The Repetitive Loss Problem,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, June 30, 2005, at
31.
72 Scales, supra note 11, at 15.
73 Id. at 16.
74 id.
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F. THE UNITED KINGDOM'S GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT
Unlike the United States' National Flood Insurance
Program, the UK has a much less formalized approach to flood
insurance, described as the "Gentleman's Agreement" between
the government and private insurance industry.75  The
Gentleman's Agreement divides responsibility between the
government, which provides flood defenses, and insurers, which
compensate property owners when there is flood damage. 76 It is
not an "explicit regulatory regime but an invisible set of rules
governing overall flood management." 77
The Gentleman's Agreement is governed by a substantially
different policy than NFIP.78 Specifically, under the Gentleman's
Agreement: 1) private insurance is not associated with land use
measures, 79 2) the insurance industry guarantees to provide
insurance for all (with premiums not to exceed one-half percent of
the sum insured),80 and 3) flood insurance is mandatory and
pooled with other risks.8
1
I. Disconnect between insurance and land use policy
Historically, the UK experiences flooding regularly in
many areas, however "the threat of floods is not taken
seriously." 82 Despite the increasing number of people exposed to
flood risk, "the awareness about the economic and social
consequences is hardly developed."8 3 The disconnect between
flood vulnerability, public awareness of the risk, and land use
regulation impedes prevention and mitigation of flood disaster in
75 See Michael Huber, Reforming the UK Flood Insurance Regime, The
Breakdown of a Gentleman's Agreement, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH





79 Id. at 2, 4.
80 d. at 4.
81 See generally Huber, supra note 75.82 Id. at 4.
8, id.
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the UK, contrasting NFIPs attempt to affect and improve land use
policy in light of flood risk.
84
II. Guaranteed insurance
Private flood insurers in the UK may guarantee insurance,
but not without qualifications. Private insurers can decline
insurance for property regularly exposed to flooding, which is
akin to "repetitive-loss" properties. However, there is no written
agreement with the government that allows insurers discretion to
withhold insurance or charge especially high premiums in order
to reflect the risk of repetitive-loss properties. 85
Also, the Gentleman's Agreement implicitly makes the
government responsible for providing sufficient flood
protection. 86  However, no provisions exist that define the
sufficiency of flood protection, or financial commitments required
by the government assumed in this agreement.87 In recent years,
lacking a vested interest in the provision of flood insurance
policies or investments in the payouts of claims, the UK
government has reduced investments in flood management.88
Private insurers bear huge potential losses for the
government's failure or negligence in providing adequate flood
defenses, which also avoids the responsibility of being an insurer
of last resort.89 The distinct division of responsibility between
insurance provision and flood management and protection has
failed to mobilize the UK government to address flood losses or
engage in more proactive and socially beneficial policy-making.
84 See generally, id.
5 Id. at 5.
86 [d.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 7.
89 Id. at 5. The UK government has, in rare instances, assisted flood victims,
and for example has provided "minimal help to flood victims in a poor, and
under-insured area." Id. at 7.
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Il. Mandatory and pooled insurance
Instead of experiencing an actuarial imbalance like the
United States' NFIP, private flood insurers in the UK maintain
their financial viability despite a lack of support from or burden
on the government. UK flood insurers achieve this sound
economic foundation through a bundled and compulsory system.
Flood hazards in the UK are bundled with all natural hazards,
which diversifies the risk and helps protect against one singular
event from giving rise to a deluge of claims. Further, flood
insurance in the UK is mandatory: mortgages are withheld from
potential homeowners unless there is full coverage for flood and
other natural disasters. Mandatory flood insurance among all
property owners, who face varying levels of flood risk, helps
spread risk across the population.
Under the Gentleman's Agreement, the main disadvantage
of mandatory and pooled flood insurance is that the "insurance
industry has insufficient incentives to identify weakness in flood
defence, patterns of individual behavior or their internal costs
structure as they subsidise costs across natural perils and the
entire insurance population." 90 Simply, moral hazard plagues the
sustainability of the Gentleman's Agreement. Despite increasing
flood risks,91 there is not enough mobilization among the
government or private insurers in the UK to identify flood risks
and minimize them.
G. FRANCE
In contrast to the UK flood insurance system, the French
flood insurance program attempts to incentivize individuals and
the government to be aware of flood risks and engage in flood
mitigating activity. At the same time, the French program faces its
own challenges.
90 Id. at 8.
91 See Hilary Osborne, Flood Damage Could Hit £6bn, Warns Insurer,
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Nov. 7, 2006, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2006/nov/07/water.homeinsurance (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
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I. Flat rates, but deductibles available
French flood insurance is mandatory as it is in the UK, and
is similarly pooled with other natural hazard risks. However the
main drawback of flood insurance in France is that there is no
premium differentiation,92  which reduces incentives for
individuals to live in low-risk flood areas due to lower, more
attractive premiums, as in the US and UK. To overcome this
disincentive, insurers provide "deductibles, to stimulate loss-
reducing measures." 93
II. Governmental role
Compared to the dominating role of the local, state, and
federal governments in NFIP and the disassociation of the UK
government in the Gentleman's Agreement, flood insurance in
France aims to achieve a balanced public-private partnership.
Private insurance companies collect premiums, and handle
claims. 94  The government protects the solvency of these
companies as insurer of last resort, willing to pay claims in excess
of the capabilities of private insurers, setting this coverage by
law.95 However, the government only steps in to compensate
flood damage when it "officially recognizes the flood as a disaster
and the area where the damage occurred as a disaster area." 96
Because the definition of disaster is unclear, and it is vague when
and if the government will provide flood assistance, some
individuals obtain private insurance outside of the public-private
partnership. 97
92 W.J.W. Botzen & J.C.J.M. van den Bergh, Insurance Against Climate Change
and Flooding in the Netherlands: Present, Future and Comparison with Other
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H. GERMANY
Compared to the flood insurance programs in France, the
UK, and the US, flood insurance in Germany is the least effective
in encouraging awareness of flood risks and pro-action to mitigate
losses. Flood insurance in Germany is available from private
insurance companies and bundled with other natural disasters
like earthquakes. 98  However, this flood insurance excludes
coverage of damage from storm surges, 99 and acts primarily to
supplement either home contents or building insurance.100
I. Low market penetration
Severely low market penetration, ten percent for home
contents and four percent for residential buildings, thwarts efforts
to spread risk over a large population. 101 Furthermore, achieving
diversified risk for insurance companies is a challenge because
adverse selection distorts the pool of flood insurance
policyholders. At the same time, flood insurance is not available
for buildings in the most flood hazard prone areas, and, if
available, comes at especially high premiums.1 02
Despite adverse selection challenges to the viability of
private flood insurance in Germany, flood insured households
have "tended to be even better informed about mitigation and
98 Annegret H. Thicken et al., Insurability and Mitigation of Flood Losses in
Private Households in Germany, 26.2 RISK ANALYSIS 383, 386 (2006).
99 Id.
100 Botzen, supra note 92, at 423.
'1' Id. However, low market penetration in Germany is not uniform. "There are
two regions with a higher-insurance density: Baden-Wuerttemberg and the
territory of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). Flood loss
compensation was generally included in mandatory building insurance in
Baden-Wuerttemberg until 1994. Due to EU regulations this monopoly
insurance had to be abandoned. Currently more than 80% of the property
owners in Baden-Wuerttemberg still have flood insurance coverage. Flood loss
coverage was also provided by the household insurance in the former
GDR...thirty to fifty percent of people in the new German states (former GDR)
still have comparable contracts." Thieken, supra note 98, at 387 (internal
citations omitted).
102 Botzen, supra note 92, at 423.
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tended to flood proof their building more often than uninsured
households." 103
II. Ad hoc governmental compensation
Exacerbating the high risk of flood loss in Germany is the
uncertainty of the extent of governmental aid in the aftermath of a
flood disaster. Although governmental recognition of flood
disaster in France follows vague guidelines, the French
government at least has clear rules, set by law, for distributing
disaster assistance once a flood disaster is determined. In
contrast, German governmental aid for flood disaster leaves
property owners exposed to uncertainty of their losses because
government aid "is not based on formal legislation... "104 Instead,
flood disaster compensation is distributed ad hoc, and can depend
"for example, on the extent of the disaster or the media
coverage."1 05
In Germany's recent history, for instance with the August
2002 flood in the catchment areas of the Elbe and Danube rivers,
the government provided extensive compensation for both
insured and uninsured households. As a result of the flood, "total
losses in Germany were estimated at 11.6 billion euro, of which
only 1.8 billion were covered by insurance." 106  Extensive
governmental aid helped fuel redevelopment, but at the same
time disincentivized uninsured individuals to purchase flood
insurance and prepare for future loss. 107
Additionally, a lack of awareness and information about
flood risks among individuals and insurers impedes German
flood loss mitigation and preparedness. At the very minimum,
flood insurance needs to be encouraged and this should be
combined with loss mitigation.108
103 Thicken, supra note 98, at 390.
104 Id. at 384.
105 id.
106 Id. at 383.
107 See id. at 390.
'o' Id. at 392-394.
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I. NETHERLANDS
The majority of damage and loss arising from Germany's
2002 flood were sustained in the public sector (fifty-five percent),
with "enormous damage to infrastructure." 109 This suggests that
like private individuals, the German government did not
proactively prepare against flood events. In contrast, the
Netherlands almost entirely invests in flood prevention and loss
through flood defense, and neither private nor public insurance,
in a traditional sense, is available for flood risk.110
I. Non-existent traditional flood insurance
In a country where seventy percent of properties lie below
sea or river water level,"1 flood risk in the Netherlands has been
considered uninsurable by private insurers since the Dutch North
Sea Flood of 1953.112 Also, the government's general reluctance to
compensate for flood loss, or be an insurer of last resort, has made
'09 Id. at 383.
110 Botzen, supra note 92, at 414, 416. One exception is private motor-hull
insurance, which insures flood damage to cars. Id. at 416, n.7.
" M. Kok et al., supra note 3, at 148.
112 Id. at 149; see also Botzen, supra note 92, at 414. "There is no flood
insurance since the flood event in 1953, because after the event it was realized
that insurance companies can become bankrupt if they continue to cover the
flood damage. At this moment, no insurance company offers standard
compensation of flood damage." M. Kok et al., supra note 3, at 149. In January
1953, spring tides and a heavy storm combined to flood Zeeland, a province in
the south western part of the Netherlands. Almost 2,000 people were killed,
70,000 people were forced to evacuate and over 4,000 homes were destroyed.
Coupled with rebuilding efforts after five years of German occupation, the flood
deeply affected the psyche of the Dutch population, mobilizing political activity.
The general national sentiment after the flood was that such a disaster should
never reoccur, which exposed "predisaster cracks in the social system" and
catalyzed innovative restoration. Uriel Rosenthal, Disaster Management in the
Netherlands: Planning for Real Events, in MANAGING DISASTER: STRATEGY
AND POL'Y PERSP. 274, 276-78 (Louise K. Comfort ed. 1988).
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private insurance even less viable. 113 However, in 1998, the Dutch
government passed the Calamities and Compensation Act (WTS),
which provides ad hoc compensation for a flood when it "results in
considerable disruption of public safety and requires a
coordinated effort of organization and civil services." 114
II. Extensive and impressive flood defense
In an attempt to prevent repeat flood losses and mitigate
against the most rare flood risk, the Dutch government mobilized
after the North Sea Flood to design and install flood coastal
defenses "to withstand floods with an exceedance probability of
1/4000 up to 1/10,000 per year. The target probability of failure
for river dikes is between 1/1250 and 1/2000 per year and
measures are being implemented to reach this goal for inadequate
dike sections." 115  Impressively, the Dutch government has
undertaken the task of engineering an extensive dike system to
withstand flood impact of overwhelming force. In contrast, NFIP
concentrates its efforts to mitigate the base line flood that has a
1/100 chance of occurrence per year.
However, the Dutch flood policy creates ambiguities as to
the consequences of potential government failure to maintain the
dikes. 116 Also, there is no legislation that entitles individuals to
flood compensation if the dikes fail or in the event that the
1/10,000 year flood event occurs.117
113 See Botzen, supra note 92, at 414.
114 Id. at 416.
115 M. Kok et al., supra note 3, at 148.
116 See id. at 153.
I See id.
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J. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM INFORMED BY FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAMS IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, GERMANY, AND THE NETHERLANDS
Under the Gentleman's Agreement, insurance companies
in the UK bear the burden of flood risk because 1) flood insurance
is mandatory, 2) despite differentiation in premiums, individuals
are not incentivized to reduce flood risk, and 3) the government
has not undertaken explicit duties to maintain flood defenses (at
pace with the challenges of rising sea levels and increasing
storms)118 or compensate when flood losses overwhelm the
insurance industry. Mandatory but flat flood insurance premiums
in France, coupled with the government's insurance of last resort,
insulate and reduce awareness of flood risks for both insurance
companies and individuals, resulting in moral hazard. In
Germany, market penetration for flood insurance is so low that
the government assumes most flood risk and addresses this
responsibility through ad hoc compensation. The Dutch
government also assumes almost all flood risk by building
extensive flood defense systems; however, the lack of a flood
insurance program or government assumption of compensation
for flood loss when the defense systems fail or are inadequate is
troubling.
Compared to these flood insurance programs in the UK,
France, Germany and the Netherlands, NFIP most actively strives
to achieve a burden sharing of flood risks between individuals,
insurance companies, and the government. Recommendations to
improve flood risk management in Europe even support the
policy model used by NFIP, stressing that: "[a] burden-sharing
mechanism should be established that targets investment in
mitigation schemes launched by governments, with support from
the CEC119 to assist people living on the floodplain (e.g. if the
household complies with such schemes and invests in flood-
18 Osborne, supra note 91.
119 Commission of the European Community, also known as the European
Commission.
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proofing initiatives, then their insurance premiums should
decrease)."' 20  However, various European flood insurance
programs explored in this paper offer examples of policies which
could improve NFIP.
I. Mandatory flood insurance
Insurance premiums should correspond to levels of flood
risk, and will be negligible for those living in high elevation areas.
The first recommendation for NFIP is requiring all property
owners to carry flood insurance. Poor market penetration of flood
insurance in Germany and the lack of flood insurance in the
Netherlands place individuals in a precarious situation, where it is
uncertain if and how much they might be compensated for flood
losses. At the same time, the lack of a compensation guarantee in
the event of flood losses can stimulate retreat from areas that are
known to have high flood risks.
In the US, NFIP's delineation of flood zones in its FBHMs
and FIRMs may similarly raise awareness of flood risks and
stimulate retreat. However, the danger of these flood maps is that
they may give a false sense of security to individuals located
outside SFHAs, who might assume they are protected from risk
and do not need to buy flood insurance or engage in flood
mitigation.
Or, these maps could create a sense of flood expectancy for
individuals in SFHAs, who might assume that their compliance
with NFIP land use standards, such as raising their basements or
reinforcing their foundations, sufficiently prevents flood loss.
Mandatory flood insurance in the UK and France avoids adverse
selection and gaps in insurance coverage when floods occur
outside of high flood risk zones. Buildings in SHFAs that are not
grandfathered-in are required to follow higher standards of land
use and control compared to property outside of SFHAs.
However, this may diminish the advantages of requiring
120 A.L. Vetere Arellano, A. De Roo & J.P. Nordvik, Reflections of the
Challenges of EU Policy-Making with View to Flood Risk Management, in
FLOOD RISK MGMT IN EUROPE 433, 465 (Selina Begum et al. eds., 2007).
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mandatory flood insurance because the availability of flood
insurance outside of SFHAs may reduce awareness and
incorporation of flood loss prevention and mitigation when there
is a guarantee that flood loss claims will be paid. To address this
moral hazard, NFIP should continue to tie insurance to land use
regulation and require minimum land use management
requirements in all zones. This would likely reduce flood loss and
the need for ad hoc governmental compensation. Also, NFIP
should offer discounts when property owners implement higher
standards of land use management than what is required. NFIP
itself should strive towards the No Adverse Impact (NAI) model
of floodplain management, in which "the action of one property
owner does not adversely impact the rights of other property
owners, as measured by increased flood peaks, flood stage, flood
velocity, and erosion and sedimentation."121
II. Premiums that reflect flood risk
By spreading flood insurance premiums over a population
that faces varying levels of flood risk, mandatory flood insurance
supports the second recommendation for NFIP: attainment of
actuarial balance. Actuarial balancing is important because it
guarantees the sustainability of flood insurance by securing a
funding source for the payout of claims, which reduces the
burden on taxpayers once flood losses occur and the lag time
between flood loss and redevelopment. 122
121 Association of State Floodplain Managers, No Adverse Impact 2 (2008),
available at http://www.floods.org/NoAdverseimpact/NAI White Paper.pdf.
Additionally, the "No adverse impact philosophy can shape the default
management criteria: a community develops and adopts a comprehensive plan to
manage development that identifies acceptable levels of impact, appropriate
measures to mitigate those adverse impacts and a plan for implementation. No
Adverse Impact can be extended to entire watersheds as a means to promote the
use of retention/detention or other techniques to mitigate increased runoff from
urban areas." Id.
122 See generally Jack Milligan, Under Water: The Federal Program to Insure
Property Owners Against Catastrophic Flood Losses is Badly in Need of a Fix,
MORTGAGE BANKING, Feb. 1, 2007, at 66.
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NFIP can attain actuarial balance through mortgage or
public utilities availability conditional on flood insurance in and
outside of SFHAs (assuming that NFIP follows the first
recommendation and requires mandatory insurance). In cases
where mortgages or utilities cannot be conditioned on flood
insurance because it is impractical or against public policy, NFIP
should enforce a property tax equivalent to the flood insurance
premiums on these properties.
Additionally, flood insurance in the US should be bundled
with other risks, as it is in the UK, France, and Germany.123
Pooling many risks, such as different types of disasters, reduces
the threat of depleting or over-extending funds to pay out claims
because it is less likely that a deluge of claims will arise out of a
single catastrophic event. And in situations where one event
(such as a hurricane) gives rise to many claims due to a
combination of various perils (wind and flood), multi-peril
insurance can deter evasion of paying out claims because there is
no need to distinguish between the sources of damages (whether
wind or flood) if the perils are covered in the policy.124
Also, in an effort to attain actuarial balance, NFIP needs to
phase out subsidies. Where flood insurance exists in the
European programs explored above, there is no evidence of
governmental subsidies. By charging premiums more closely
related to flood risk levels, individuals are likely to gain greater
123 Botzen, supra note 92, at 422-23; see also M. Kok et al., supra note 3, at
147-48.
124 See Multi Peril Insurance Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 920 Before the
Subcomm. of the H. Fin. Serv. Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Rep.
Charlie Melancon) ("By bundling wind and water coverage into one plan, multi-
peril insurance would cover home damaged by hurricanes, regardless of whether
winds or flooding caused the damage. Not only will this provide homeowners
with peace of mind, it will indirectly save them money because they will be able
to avoid costly and time-consuming legal battles like those waged after Katrina
and Rita, when many homeowners had to hire lawyers and engineers for
independent assessments. A multi-peril insurance policy will also create more
efficiency in adjusting claims, and homeowners will receive their payments
much faster than under the current two-policy system.").
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awareness of the severity of this risk and have lower incentives to
live in high flood risk areas.
On the downside, charging full actuarial rates may
excessively burden some property owners, such as those still
recovering from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 125 For example, in
some instances "flood-insurance premiums would go up so high
that homeowners might decide not to rebuild their damaged or
destroyed homes if they couldn't afford the premiums or the cost
of elevating their homes above sea level, which would qualify
them for lower premiums." 126 Higher premiums for owners of
older properties could also potentially force individuals to become
delinquent on their mortgages and increase the potential for
foreclosure. 127 These negative social consequences arise because
of unsustainable development in high risk flood zones without
corresponding mitigation of flood risks. As difficult as it may be,
phasing out subsidies is critical to achieving more rational
behavior in response to flood risk, which is necessary to protect
people and property from future losses.
K. CONCLUSION
Increasing sea levels and extreme storm events due to
growing climate change exacerbate flood risks. Although humans
cannot directly control heavy precipitation or extreme flood
events, humans can learn to live with these events, and "behave in
a manner to mitigate potential risks for people and [property]. " 128
Within the United States, mandatory flood insurance and
compliance with minimum land use regulation will strengthen the
existing NFIP. Also, protection of NFIP's finances by achieving
actuarial balancing and passing costs to property owners will
ensure sustainability of NFIP and encourage more rational
125 Milligan, supra note 122, at 66, 68-69.
126 Id. at 69.
127 id.
128 See Best Practices on Flood Prevention, Protection and Mitigation, supra
note 1, at 29.
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behavior informed by serious and growing flood risk. Greater
awareness and preparedness for flooding events will help protect
against unnecessary human and economic loss, as experienced
with Hurricane Katrina.129
Although beyond the scope of this paper, in addition to
strengthening NFIP, the U.S. government needs more
comprehensive 130 and better maintained flood defenses, especially
when juxtaposed with Netherlands' extensive flood defense
system which, at the minimum, is able to withstand floods that
have a probability of occurrence of 1/2,000 per year.131
Investment in flood defenses also reduces the need for ad hoc
governmental assistance after a flood disaster, which can be more
expensive than the flood defenses themselves. An integrated
approach to flood disaster prevention and mitigation spreads the
burden of flood risk among property owners and the government,
which depend on each other's rational decision-making to stay
above the water.
129 See Michael D. Adler, Policy Analysis for Natural Hazards: Some
Cautionary Lessonsfrom Environmental Policy, 56 DUKE L. J. 1, 4 (2006).
130 Especially natural flood defenses, such as marshes, sand banks and mangrove
swamps. See Sami Grover, The Tide is Turning: Natural Flood Defence Makes a
Come-back, TREEHUGGER, July 9, 2006, http://www.treehugger.com/
files/2006/07/flood defense.php.
131 See M. Kok et al., supra note 3, at 148.
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